Blackburn v. State Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 44184 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-13-2016
Blackburn v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44184
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Blackburn v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44184" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6204.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6204
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
RODNEY GENE BLACKBURN JR, ) 
      ) NO. 44184 
 Petitioner-Appellant,  )       
) CANYON COUNTY NO.  
v.      ) CV 2015-11578 
      )       
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
      ) 
 Respondent.   ) 
 ) 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER S. NYE 
District Judge  
________________________ 
 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN    KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Interim State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho     Criminal Law Division 
I.S.B. #6555      P.O. Box 83720 
       Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
BRIAN R. DICKSON    (208) 334-4534 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8701 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701  
(208) 334-2712 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR      ATTORNEY FOR 
PETITIONER-APPELLANT   RESPONDENT
 i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................1 
 Nature of the Case .....................................................................................1 
 
 Statement of the Facts and 
 Course of Proceedings ...............................................................................2 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .......................................................................4 
ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................5 
 
 The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Blackburn’s  
 Petition For Post-Conviction Relief ..................................................................5 
 
A. Standard Of Review ...................................................................................5 
 
B. The District Court’s Analysis In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Blackburn’s  
  Claim About The Advice To Pursue A Rule 35 Motion Instead Of A  
  Direct Appeal Is Contrary To Idaho Supreme Court And United  
  States Supreme Court Precedent ...............................................................6 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148 (2008) .......................................................................... 5 
Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356 (Ct. App. 1994) .................................................... 5, 8, 9 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789 (2004) ............................................................... 5, 8 
Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367 (Ct. App. 2001) ........................................................... 5 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50 (2004).............................................................................. 5 
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588 (Ct. App. 1993) ................................................................. 6 
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847 (2004) ......................................................................... 5 
Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................................................ 5 
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) ............................................................. 6, 8, 9 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201 (2007) ......................................................................... 7 
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722 (2007).............................................................................. 7 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ............................................................... 5 
 
Rules 
 
I.C.R. 35 ................................................................................................................. passim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Rodney Blackburn contends the district court erred when it summarily dismissed 
his petition for post-conviction relief, as he had alleged at least one genuine issue of 
material fact in his verified petition.  Specifically, he alleged that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not advising him about the ramifications of not filing an appeal, but rather, 
erroneously advising him to file a motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, 
Rule 35 motion) instead of pursuing a direct appeal.   
Because Mr. Blackburn’s allegations establish that trial counsel did not fulfill his 
duty to consult with him as that duty has been defined by the United States Supreme 
Court, and because a Rule 35 motion is not an alternative to a direct appeal, 
Mr. Blackburn’s allegations establish at least a genuine issue of material fact that trial 
counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable.  Additionally, since the United 
States Supreme Court has determined there is a presumption of prejudice when 
counsel’s objectively deficient performance deprives the defendant of an appeal he 
would have otherwise pursued, Mr. Blackburn’s allegations, combined with the fact 
found by the district court – that Mr. Blackburn “agreed” with counsel’s advice – 
establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding prejudice.  As such, summary 
dismissal of the petition was inappropriate. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate the Final Judgment as well as the order 
summarily dismissing the post-conviction petition, and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 In his underlying criminal case, Mr. Blackburn pleaded guilty to violating a no 
contact order and was sentenced to a unified term of four years, with one year fixed.  
(R., p.4.)  In his subsequent petition for post-conviction relief, he argued, inter alia, that 
“[t]rial counsel coerced Petitioner into foregoing filing a notice of appeal from his 
conviction and sentence by giving faulty advice to file a Rule 35 instead.”  (R., p.7.) 
 Specifically, Mr. Blackburn alleged trial counsel had not discussed “the 
ramifications of not filing an appeal” with him, but instead, advised him that “‘[a]n appeal 
is not necessary’ and ‘that a Rule 35 would be more appropriate.’”  (R., p.7.)  
Additionally, “[t]he petitioner contends why would he not avail[] himself of this right as he 
had absolutely nothing to lose by appealing and possibl[y] much to gain.”  (R., p.7.)  
“Second petitioner finds fault with trial counsel because the very reason counsel cited 
for not filing the notice of appeal was the presentation of a Rule 35, of which he did not 
do.”1  (R, p.7.)   
 In providing notice of its intent to summarily dismiss Mr. Blackburn’s petition, the 
district court found that “Counsel gave his advice as to the best manner to proceed and 
the Petitioner agreed.”  (R., p.49.)  Mr. Blackburn did not file a response to the district 
                                            
1 In the interest of full disclosure and accurate understanding of the procedural history of 
this matter, undersigned counsel notes that, after Mr. Blackburn filed his petition for 
post-conviction relief, trial counsel filed an untimely, unsupported Rule 35 motion with 
the district court in the criminal case.  (See Online Repository for the underlying case, 
CR 2015-7210).  Undersigned counsel is informed and believes the district court 
ultimately denied that motion, addressing the merits of the claim when it did so.  
However, those documents were not made part of the post-conviction record, nor was 
the matter discussed by the district court or the parties in the post-conviction case.  
(See generally R., Tr.)  As such, Mr. Blackburn is not moving to augment the record with 
them, nor would it be proper to consider them in this appeal. 
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court’s notice of intent to dismiss.  (See Tr., p.3, Ls.2-7; see generally R.)  Pursuant to 
its notice of intent, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Blackburn’s claim about 
trial counsel’s advice to not file a notice of appeal, concluding:  “Petitioner provides no 
facts to show that counsel’s advice not to appeal was deficient due to any of these 
factors [related to a review of counsel’s strategic decisions] or was otherwise not 
reasonable.”  (R., p.56.)  Furthermore, it concluded:  “The fact that every person 
convicted of a crime may file an appeal does not mean there is a valid basis for appeal 
in every case.  As such, Petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”  (R., p.56.)   
 Mr. Blackburn filed a notice of appeal timely from the Final Judgment dismissing 
his petition.  (R., pp.60, 62.)   
 4 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Blackburn’s petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
 5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Blackburn’s Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief 
 
A. Standard Of Review 
 
On appeal from a summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, the 
appellate court “reviews the record to determine if issues of material fact exist, which 
require an evidentiary hearing.”  Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370 (Ct. App. 2001); 
cf. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008) (holding that a petition for post-
conviction relief may be summarily dismissed only if it does not present a genuine issue 
of material fact).  In conducting that review, the appellate court accepts the district 
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but reviews the district court’s 
application of the relevant law to those facts de novo.  Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56 
(2004). 
To show a genuine issue of material fact in regard to a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel,2 the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance fell below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was 
prejudiced by that deficient performance.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984); McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004).  In evaluating whether there is a 
genuine issue of material fact, the courts “liberally construe the facts and reasonable 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party,” in this case, Mr. Blackburn.  Nevarez v. 
State, 145 Idaho 878, 881 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 
                                            
2 Defendants have the right to reasonably-effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.  See, e.g., Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 359-60 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
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789, 792 (2004) (“[I]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the petitioner.”).  The 
allegations in a petitioner’s verified petition alone may establish a genuine issue of 
material fact.  Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 
B. The District Court’s Analysis In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Blackburn’s Claim 
About The Advice To Pursue A Rule 35 Motion Instead Of A Direct Appeal Is 
Contrary To Idaho Supreme Court And United States Supreme Court Precedent 
 
The district court’s determination that Mr. Blackburn’s allegations of fact – that 
trial counsel did not discuss the ramifications of not appealing, told him that “an appeal 
was not necessary,” and advised him that a Rule 35 motion was “more appropriate” and 
so, he should pursue that motion instead (R., p.7) – did not present a genuine issue of 
material fact is mistaken in regard to both prongs of the Strickland analysis.   
To the first prong of that analysis, to perform in an objectively-reasonable 
manner, trial counsel must fulfill his duty to consult with a defendant about a direct 
appeal once the defendant has reasonably demonstrated an interest in appealing.  
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000).  Mr. Blackburn’s allegations establish 
that he expressed at least an interest in appealing, otherwise counsel’s advice that a 
direct appeal is “not necessary” makes no sense.  (See R., p.7.)  Therefore, trial 
counsel was duty-bound to consult with Mr. Blackburn about the direct appeal.    
The United States Supreme Court has explained:  “We employ the term ‘consult’ 
to convey a specific meaning—advising the defendant about the advantages and 
disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the 
defendant’s wishes.”  Id. at 478.  Mr. Blackburn alleged counsel did not discuss the 
ramifications of not filing an appeal with him.  (R., p.7.)  That alleged fact alone 
establishes a genuine issue of material fact in regard to deficient performance because, 
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if liberally construed in Mr. Blackburn’s favor, it demonstrates trial counsel did not fulfill 
his duty to consult with Mr. Blackburn as that duty has been defined by the United 
States Supreme Court. 
Furthermore, the advice trial counsel gave in his attempt to fulfill that duty was 
unreasonable on its face as it was contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent.  The 
Idaho Supreme Court has clearly held:  “Rule 35 does not function as an appeal of the 
sentence.”  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).  Rather, the two proceedings 
serve different purposes.  On the one hand, Rule 35 “is a narrow rule” which only allows 
the defendant to dispute the legality of his sentence, to request leniency in the 
sentence, or to challenge the calculation of credit for time served.  See id.; I.C.R. 35(a)-
(c).  Thus, Rule 35 is designed to allow the district court to review the sentence in light 
of new or additional information.  See Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203.  In a direct appeal of 
the sentence, on the other hand, the appellate court only reviews the information that 
had been before the district court at the time of sentencing.  See, e.g. State v. Oliver, 
144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007).  Therefore, a Rule 35 motion is not an alternative to a direct 
appeal, which means it cannot stand in the stead of a direct appeal.  As such, trial 
counsel’s advice to Mr. Blackburn – to pursue a Rule 35 motion instead of a direct 
appeal (R., p.7) – was objectively unreasonable advice.     
Since the facts alleged in Mr. Blackburn’s verified petition, liberally construed in 
his favor, establish that trial counsel failed to fulfill his duty to consult with Mr. Blackburn, 
and gave objectively unreasonable advice in his attempt to do so, Mr. Blackburn’s 
allegations established a genuine issue of material fact under the first prong of 
Strickland. 
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As to the second prong of Strickland, Mr. Blackburn alleged sufficient facts to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact that counsel’s objectively-deficient 
performance prejudiced him.  The United States Supreme Court has held that, “when 
counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that 
he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.”  Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 478.  
Therefore, a presumption of prejudice exists in this context, meaning all the defendant is 
required to show in his petition is that he would have filed the appeal.  See Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. at 478.  The reason that is so is that the “loss [of the opportunity to 
appeal] is itself sufficient prejudice to support a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel . . . .”  Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 362 (Ct. App. 1994); cf. Flores-Ortega, 
528 U.S. at 483.  
Mr. Blackburn alleged as much in his verified petition:  “The petitioner contends 
why would he not avail[] himself of this right as he had absolutely nothing to lose by 
appealing and possibl[y] much to gain.”  (R., p.7.)  Although framed as a rhetorical 
question, what Mr. Blackburn alleged is, but for the erroneous advice about Rule 35 
being a valid alternative to the direct appeal, he would have exercised his right to 
appeal “as he had absolutely nothing to lose and possibl[y] much to gain.”  Cf. 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792 (“[I]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the 
petitioner.”).  Therefore, there was at least a genuine issue of material fact as to 
prejudice under the standard articulated in Flores-Ortega. 
The district court, however, did not apply the Flores-Ortega standard.  Instead, it 
required Mr. Blackburn to show there was a valid basis for an appeal.  (R., p.56 (“The 
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fact that every person convicted of a crime may file an appeal does not mean that there 
is a valid basis for an appeal.  Petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”).  The United States Supreme Court has expressly 
rejected such analysis:  “[I]t is unfair to require an indigent, perhaps pro se, defendant to 
demonstrate that his hypothetical appeal might have had merit before any advocate has 
ever reviewed the record in his case in search of potentially meritorious grounds for 
appeal.”3  Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 486 (emphasis from original omitted).  Rather, as 
the Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, “the defendant should not be required to 
identify the meritorious issues that would have been raised, but should be restored to 
the status enjoyed immediately following the judgment of conviction when the defendant 
was entitled to a direct appeal.”  Beasley, 126 Idaho at 361.  Therefore, the district 
court’s analysis on this issue was improper and should be rejected.  
Since Mr. Blackburn’s allegations establish at least a genuine issue of material 
fact on both prongs of the Strickland test, as they have been defined by Idaho and 
United States Supreme Court precedent, summary dismissal of his claim about 
counsel’s erroneous advice to forgo his right to an appeal and file a Rule 35 motion 
instead was inappropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
3 The Supreme Court made this declaration about the need to have an attorney review 
the record for appellate issues even though defendant in Flores-Ortega had been 
represented by counsel in the trial court and that attorney had, at least, considered the 
possibility of an appeal.  See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 473. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Blackburn respectfully requests that this Court vacate the Final Judgment as 
well as the order summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition and remand this case 
for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 13th day of September, 2016. 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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